This book is a major contribution to the current theory of liberalism by an eminent political theorist. It challenges the views of such theorists as Rawls, Dworkin, and Ackerman who believe that the essence of liberalism is that it should remain neutral concerning different ways of life and individual conceptions of what is good or valuable. Professor Galston argues that the modern liberal state is committed to a distinctive conception of the human good, and to that end has developed characteristic (...) institutions and practices - representative governments, diverse societies, market economies, and zones of private action - in the pursuit of specific public purposes that give unity to the liberal state. These purposes guide liberal public policy, shape liberal justice, require the practice of liberal virtues, and rest on a liberal public culture. Consequently the diversity characteristic of liberal societies is limited by their institutional, personal, and cultural preconditions. (shrink)

This article first addresses the question of “why” we teach business ethics. Our answer to “why” provides both a response to those who oppose business ethics courses and a direction for course content. We believe a solid, comprehensive course in business ethics should address not only moral philosophy, ethical dilemmas, and corporate social responsibility – the traditional pillars of the disciple – but also additional areas necessary to make sense of the goings-on in the business world and in the news. (...) These “new pillars,” that we advocate include moral psychology, organizational design and behavior, motivational theory, and a unit on how society, business, and law interact. This last unit builds upon the work of Francis P. McHugh (1988) who urged an integration of “disciplines related to business ethics.” Our seventh pillar would encompass an integration of law, socio-political theory, and policy to demonstrate how business helps construct its own regulatory framework. The concluding recommendation is for a comprehensive “Seven Pillars” of business ethics approach. (shrink)

The works of Plato have been a cornerstone of Western philosophy for centuries, inspiring countless readers and thinkers over the course of millennia. But not all of the writings attributed to Plato are genuine. In this scholarly investigation, W.A. Heidel explores the origins and authenticity of some of these so-called 'pseudo-Platonic' texts, providing insights into the ways in which ancient cultures valued and appropriated the ideas of its greatest thinkers. This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, (...) and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Speck's biography examines Paine's work afresh, in light of new thinking about the role of religion in the formation of his political ideology, and also places Paine within the recently-developed context of 'Atlantic History'.

Cannabis use in some individuals can meaningfully introduce de novo risk for the initiation of opioid use and development of opioid use disorder. These risks may be particularly high during adolescence when cannabis use may disrupt critical periods of neurodevelopment. Current research studying the combination of genetic and environmental factors involved in substance use disorders is poorly understood. More research is needed, particularly to identify which adolescents are most at risk and to develop effective interventions addressing contributing factors such as (...) trauma and psychiatric comorbidity. (shrink)

From the introductory chapter. The distinctions taken between the necessary and the contingent, in philosophical discussion no less than in common life, are ordinarily supposed to be so definitive and are permitted so deeply to influence our conceptions that it seems well worth one's while to examine them in their origin. And the Aristotelian system will best serve our purpose as a corpus vile for very obvious reasons. In the first place, Aristotle is the earliest systematic philosopher who essayed to (...) treat consistently of all the greater problems of life and thought, and whose works remain to be studied. His method, too, was such that, standing as he did just on the verge of formalism, the definitions which he attempted still bear definite traces of the purely functional meaning of those terms, while his formulation of their significance has led naturally to their solidification as objective facts in the world. For Aristotle was wont to preface his own conclusions by inquiring, rather superficially to be sure, into the psychology of the conceptions in question ; yet, while the inadequacy of his psychology is now admitted on all hands, the inferences as to fact which he deduced therefrom are even now in part accepted as conclusive. When one reflects upon it this state of the question strikes one as absurd. For this reason there appears to be the greater justification for an analysis of the presuppositions on which these conceptions rest. If one grants their validity, the conclusions and the resultant contradictions of the system must be accepted as ultimate. But I am convinced that Aristotle's presuppositions and his real problems were wholly unreconcilable with each other, and so his contradictions serve all the better to point out the direction in which their solution lay. Plato made the acute observation that surprise is the beginning of philosophy, and Aristotle appropriated and further applied the thought.' The full sweep of the truth contained in these words is vastly greater, however, than they knew. The feeling of wonder is indeed the point of departure for philosophy ; but what precisely does it mean? It indicates first of all that an old habit has been broken up. Old conceptions, like the proverbial old bottles, have become so surcharged with the new wine of meaning that they have burst. But to say this is to describe the phenomenon merely as A brute fact without according it any symbolic value. This state of surprise must acquire an ideal worth, an indicative function, if it is really to become the parent of philosophy. Briefly, then, we may say : surprise indicates the need of reconstructing our supposed facts. And this statement is to be taken at its full value, with all its implications, if philosophy is to be achieved.... (shrink)

Last year marks the first year of implementation for both the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act in the United States. As a result, healthcare reform is moving in the direction of integrating care for physical and mental illness, nudging clinicians to consider medical and psychiatric comorbidity as the expectation rather than the exception. Understanding the intersections of physical and mental illness with autonomy and self-determination in a system realigning its values (...) so fundamentally therefore becomes a top priority for clinicians. Yet Bioethics has missed opportunities to help guide clinicians through one of medicine's most ethically rich and challenging fields. Bioethics' distancing from mental illness is perhaps best explained by two overarching themes: 1) An intrinsic opposition between approaches to personhood rooted in Bioethics' early efforts to protect the competent individual from abuses in the research setting; and 2) Structural forces, such as deinstitutionalization, the Patient Rights Movement, and managed care. These two themes help explain Bioethics' relationship to mental health ethics and may also guide opportunities for rapprochement. The potential role for Bioethics may have the greatest implications for international human rights if bioethicists can re-energize an understanding of autonomy as not only free from abusive intrusions but also with rights to treatment and other fundamental necessities for restoring freedom of choice and self-determination. Bioethics thus has a great opportunity amid healthcare reform to strengthen the important role of the virtuous and humanistic care provider. (shrink)

After preparing to lead a quiet life as a teacher and scholar of political theory, William Galston has spent the past quarter century crossing the boundaries between academia and public life, including a two-year stint as Deputy Assistant for Domestic Policy under President Clinton. Reflecting these boundary-crossings, Public Matters contains a selection of Galston's essays on politics, policy, and religion.

At the mid-point of the twentieth century, many philosophers in the English-speaking world regarded political and moral philosophy as all but moribund. Thinkers influenced by logical positivism believe that ethical statements are merely disguised expressions of individual emotion lacking propositional force, or that the conditions for the validation of ethical statements could not be specified, or that their content, however humanly meaningful, is inexpressible. Philosophical Dimensions of Public Policy presents thirty-four articles written by research scholars numerous fields-philosophy, political theory, medicine, (...) law, biology, economics, ecology and sociology-treating a broad range of topics in practical philosophy. The Institute for Philosophy and Public Affairs has been home for these ideas, pioneering a distinctive method of conducting inquiry into the moral dimensions of public life, and contributing to public discussion and deliberation. Members of the Institute reject the idea that public philosophy means reaching into the philosopher's tool-kit and "applying" prefabricated theories to particular problems. They set in motion a dialogue between the distinctive moral features of practical problems and the more general moral theories or considerations that seem most likely to elucidate these problems. The volume is divided into five areas: "Politics, Civic Life, and Moral Education"; "Diversity, Identity, and Equal Opportunity"; "Human Rights, Development Ethics, and International Justice"; "Biotechnology, Genetic Research, and Health Policy"; and "Natural Environment, Human Communities." Philosophical Dimensions of Public Policy presents empirical data and philosophical arguments with the intention of informing public policy and public deliberation. Scholars as well as graduate and undergraduate students are certain to find it useful to their research work. Verna V. Gehring is editor at the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy at the School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland. She serves as editor of Philosophy & Public Policy Quarterly, reviewer of ethics manuscripts for Oxford University Press, and moderator for the Aspen Institute. William A. Galston is director at the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy at the School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland. He is a political theorist who both studies and participates in American politics and domestic policy. Galston is the author of nearly one hundred articles on moral and political theory, American politics, and public policy, and the author of five books, including Liberal Purposes. (shrink)

We tend to suppose that the ancient Greeks had primitive ideas of the self, of responsibility, freedom, and shame, and that now humanity has advanced from these to a more refined moral consciousness. Bernard Williams's original and radical book questions this picture of Western history. While we are in many ways different from the Greeks, Williams claims that the differences are not to be traced to a shift in these basic conceptions of ethical life. We are more like the ancients (...) than we are prepared to acknowledge, and only when this is understood can we properly grasp our most important differences from them, such as our rejection of slavery. The author is a philosopher, but much of his book is directed to writers such as Homer and the tragedians, whom he discusses as poets and not just as materials for philosophy. At the center of his study is the question of how we can understand Greek tragedy at all, when its world is so far from ours. Williams explains how it is that when the ancients speak, they do not merely tell us about themselves, but about ourselves. _Shame and Necessity_ gives a new account of our relations to the Greeks, and helps us to see what ethical ideas we need in order to live in the modern world. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:_Russell_ journal (home office): E:CPBRRUSSJOURTYPE2502\REVIEWS.252 : 2006-02-27 11:52  Reviews FREEDOM ISN’T ACADEMIC W B Educational Studies / U. of British Columbia Vancouver, , Canada   .@. Conrad Russell. An Intelligent Person’s Guide to Liberalism. London: Duckworth, . Pp. . £. (hb). Academic Freedom. London and New York: Routledge, . Pp. xi, . £. (pb). ho is the intelligent person of the first title? Is it the brainy (...) reader who Wknows about liberalism, and merely wants to update her knowledge? Is it the clever author who offers a guide out of the goodness of his heart? Or more likely, is it the sharp publisher, who knows a good selling point when he or she sees one? One guesses it is the publisher. But as to the present volume, few will complain of the title’s ambiguity, for it entices readers into an compact, well written, and timely argument on political matters of the first importance. Conrad Russell was the author of Academic Freedom, a well regarded and similarly compressed discussion of academic freedom. Academic Freedom preceded the Guide to Liberalism by six years. It was as though Russell had first to taste and see the awful effects of neo-conservatism in his beloved University of  Conrad Russell has a world reputation as an historian of the English Civil War, of the whole seventeenth century, and of the social history of politics before . His several books and hundreds of articles and reviews show that he had an apparently effortless mastery of most world history since the Reformation. I have been unable to deal with Conrad’s historical output in this review, but have discussed it in a forthcoming biographical essay about Conrad Russell in the Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly, “Conrad Russell as Political Intellectual”, forthcoming in . _Russell_ journal (home office): E:CPBRRUSSJOURTYPE2502\REVIEWS.252 : 2006-02-27 11:52 Reviews  London and then, six years later—after due reflection upon the whole horrid mess—to provide a compelling political remedy to the evil apparatus of Mrs. Thatcher and Mr. Major. Academic Freedom, a sister volume to the Guide, dealt with the intellectual and administrative liberty that university teachers must have if their work is to be academically viable and socially valuable. Already in , Academic Freedom offered a sharp attack on the Thatcherite use of league tables and performance indicators, and on high civil servants, vice-chancellors, and government ministers who rely on the numbers. In effect, accountants and managers and long lists of numbers had overtaken much that universities did. Academic Freedom ended with a straightforward prescription: university teachers and (on occasion) responsible administrators should make the hard academic decisions to which they are called—not civil servants, not numbercrunchers, not politicians. This view did not mean elected politicians were released from the burden of honest choice and decision, particularly in regions of governance and public life for which they had direct responsibility and care. But Russell’s point remained: it would be madness if statistical tables replaced responsible and able human beings, or if those human beings accepted that they must become automatic “decision machines”. Conrad Russell died on  October , but must have had a form of prescience. For in , more than thirty academic units and fields were eliminated in United Kingdom universities on grounds of efficiency, ranking in league tables, and performance indication. Each time the administrator concerned threw up her hands, claiming she had no choice, as the league table or the last Research Assessment Exercise “made me do it”. Up the line, politicians have gone further, even rejoicing in the New Management of British higher education and the pleasant prospect of even greater “efficiencies” in the next decade. Conrad Russell well understood that freedom is not just academic. An Intelligent Person’s Guide to Liberalism relies, then, on recent political history to provide its main narrative thrust. By the mid-point of the book, one has the impression that current events have shaped his liberalism, and that his understanding of the history of liberalism is “presentist”. But Conrad Russell starts by saying that he doesn’t pretend to be writing history (or philosophy) in his Guide. To call Conrad Russell “presentist” is to underplay... (shrink)

We tend to suppose that the ancient Greeks had primitive ideas of the self, of responsibility, freedom, and shame, and that now humanity has advanced from these to a more refined moral consciousness. Bernard Williams's original and radical book questions this picture of Western history. While we are in many ways different from the Greeks, Williams claims that the differences are not to be traced to a shift in these basic conceptions of ethical life. We are more like the ancients (...) than we are prepared to acknowledge, and only when this is understood can we properly grasp our most important differences from them, such as our rejection of slavery. The author is a philosopher, but much of his book is directed to writers such as Homer and the tragedians, whom he discusses as poets and not just as materials for philosophy. At the center of his study is the question of how we can understand Greek tragedy at all, when its world is so far from ours. Williams explains how it is that when the ancients speak, they do not merely tell us about themselves, but about ourselves. _Shame and Necessity_ gives a new account of our relations to the Greeks, and helps us to see what ethical ideas we need in order to live in the modern world. (shrink)

Our comment is based on a simple but, we believe, compelling principle. The proposed cognitive processes and functions that are components of Jablonka and Ginsburg’s Unlimited Associative Learning (UAL) are real and are fundamental elements in the varieties of consciousness, cognition, problem solving, and sentience in the species they identify. But, from our perspective, they didn’t function as the metaphoric biomolecular ship that brought consciousness into being. The UAL functions are, and should be viewed as, evolutionary steps that built upon (...) a deeper and much older cognitive foundation. The appearance of UAL didn’t allow consciousness to emerge. It allowed it to change the manner in which sentience was instantiated − just as a host of other evolutionary developments did. In short, the emergence of UAL is a _token_ on a continuum of mental experience and not a distinct _type_ of mentation. (shrink)

The practice of modern craniomaxillofacial surgery has been defined by emergent technologies allowing for the acquisition, storage, utilization, and transfer of massive amounts of sensitive and identifiable patient data. This alone has thrust providers into an unlikely and unprecedented role as the stewards of vast databases of digital information. This data powers the potent surgical tool of virtual surgical planning, a method by which craniomaxillofacial surgeons plan and simulate procedural outcomes in a digital environment. Further complicating this new terrain is (...) the involvement of third‐party contractors—a necessary presence in bringing raw data to bear in the office, virtual space, and operating room. The individual privileges and responsibilities of patients, providers, and vendors towards data are situated within the most recent U.S. court rulings and regulations. This paper offers guidance for overseeing the safe and responsible transfer to third‐party contractors, and provides suggestions for negotiating the trinary relationship between physicians, their patients, and the vendors offering this transformative technology. (shrink)

This in-depth examination of the major theories of economic justice focuses on the central question: What should the economic distribution of goods and services be based on?

Bernard Williams (1929–2003) was by some measure the most important and influential British moral philosopher of the late twentieth century. In his hands moral philosophy was interpreted so broadly that it encompassed many other fields as well, such as political philosophy, epistemology, metaphysics and the philosophy of mind. In this volume, a summation of his career, Williams was drawn to the subject of the history of philosophy which he distinguished clearly from the history of ideas. Although Williams had always argued (...) that philosophy needs history, he wanted to show through the essays why philosophy has a need of a history of its own. Written with Williams's characteristic verve and clarity, this volume will prove indispensable to students of philosophy, the history of ideas, classics, and religious studies, and will offer fitting testament to 'a generous and humane thinker who … was the outstanding moral philosopher of his age.'. (shrink)

This introduction to philosophy offers a selection of readings based on an interdisciplinary, applied approach and illustrating the challenges religion, science, and morality pose to one another. It demonstrates to readers how philosophy is practiced today, rather than in years past, and engages them in a relevant and immediately comprehensible manner. The book maintains the critical, rational edge of traditional philosophical writing, while at the same time incorporating material and approaches not usually found in introductory volumes. Reason sections provide traditional (...) philosophical truth claims made in each subject; Culture sections investigate the social issues that arise from these claims. What Is Morality? Morality and the Good Life. Morality in Higher Education. Morality in Film. Morality in Law. Morality in Markets. Morality and Rational Self-Interest. Classical Theories of Morality. Critical Perspectives on Morality. Feelings and Reason in Morality. What Is Science? Science and a Meaningful Life. The Scientific World View and Its Critics. Science, Technology and the Transformation of Culture. Biology and Ethics. Scientific Determinism and Human Responsibility. Objectivity and Values in Science. Truth and Progress in Science. How Much Can Science Explain? What Is Religion? Religion and the Meaning of Life. Pluralism and Religious Diversity. Religion and Politics. Religion and Education. Evidence for the Existence of God? Evidence Against the Existence of God? Faith and Reason? Religious Practice without God? For anyone interested in philosophy. (shrink)